research paper

The aim of this paper is to describe and explain how American mass communicators used propaganda to influence the people during the World War I period and right after the end of the war. Mass communication is the field where professional communicators select and convey data trough a medium such as television, radio and newspapers in order to shape audience's attitudes. During the early twenty century mass communication was used by governments to enforce their political choices concerning the European wars. The specific tool used by American communicators during the First World War was propaganda, described by Lasswell as « the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols. »(627) In order to influence American citizens about the necessity of the entry on war , the government created a committee specialized on that issue , that used many tools to gain people attention.

The American agency responsible of spreading propagandist messages was the Committee on Public Information (CPI). This institution was created due to the absence of unity inside the population when America entered the war on April 6, 1917. For the government of that time public support was fundamental to win the war. Therefore, the CPI was formed on April 13, 1917, by Wilson in order “to promote the war domestically while publicizing American war aims abroad” (Aaron Delwiche, 2001). The CPI used publicity techniques based on a deep knowledge of human thought and symbolized the first institution inside a democratic government using propaganda. It had not the role of censorship as in totalitarian regimes; however it has a close function. Delwiche described the CPI saying that "it came as close to performing that function as any government agency in the US has ever done." the Committee on Public Information was formed by 19 sub-divisions that were specialized on a specific kind of propaganda. One of these subdivisions was the Division of News, “which distributed more than 6,000 press releases and acted as the primary conduit for war-related information.” Further than the use of written messages, the committee used also illustrations, in fact Delwiche stated that it "had at its disposal many of the most talented advertising illustrators and cartoonists of the time," producing many posters and billboards diffused all over the state. The cinema was also a very effective tool in their hands because it collaborated to the CPI efforts. In fact, in an editorial published in The Motion Picture News in 1917 it was announced that "every individual at work in this industry wants to do his share" and assured that "through slides, film leaders and trailers, posters, and newspaper publicity they will spread that propaganda so necessary to the immediate mobilization of the country's great resources."

In order to shape people's attitude and manipulating tem the CPI made a huge use of communication techniques in their process of conveying meanings and messages to the audience. In fact, Lasswell claimed that "not bombs nor bread, but words, pictures, songs, parades, and many similar devices are the typical means of making propaganda." Also he stressed on the fact that "propaganda relies on symbols to attain its end: the manipulation of collective attitudes." As an illustration we may consider Hitler's rise of popularity that occurred in Germany, whereas nowadays his ideology is severely criticized and rejected. Lasswell in his analysis of mass communication during World War I (1927) concluded that due to its persuasive nature « propaganda is one of the most powerful instrumentalities in the modern world »(220) Furthermore, for him the American population was naïve and easily influenced by the propaganda of the war time .He described further this naïve tendency of the receivers noticing that « the audience was captive, attentive, and gullible...the citizenry sat glued to the radio, helpless victims » (Sears and Kosterman,1994,p.254)

The propaganda techniques commonly used during World War I are the use of emotion, demonizing Germany and using lies. Because propaganda implies to "do the other fellow's thinking for him," it brings the need for governments to convey indirect messages to the audience. Therefore, the use of emotional appeals is viewed as a necessary instrument for manipulation. According to an article from Scientific Monthly "the detailed suffering of a little girl and her kitten can motivate our hatred against the Germans, arouse our sympathy for Armenians, make us enthusiastic for the Red Cross, or lead us to give money for a home for cats." Many slogan were used in The United States in that time such as The Criminal Kaiser," and "Make the World Safe For Democracy." Many analysts have explained the failure of German propaganda toward Americans because it was full of logic rather than passion. Count von Bernstorff, a German diplomat, believed that "the outstanding characteristic of the average American is rather a great, though superficial, sentimentality."
The other tool used by American propagandists is to give a bad image of Germany or the demonization of the enemy, because they needed the support of their population to go on the war and legitimize the creation of an open hostility toward Germany. As stated by Lasswell:"So great are the psychological resistances to war in modern nations that every war must appear to be a war of defence against a menacing, murderous aggressor. There must be no ambiguity about who the public is to hate." To achieve their goals they adopted a specific strategy based on telling horrible stories about their enemy which is described by Lasswell as "a handy rule for arousing hate". American authorities have so excessively abused of these stories for instance the one about a tub full of eyeballs that right after the war Edward Bernays the director of CPI (the Committee on Public Information) propaganda efforts in Latin America confessed the use of unsubstantiated allegations in order to rouse general protestation in opposition to Germany. These propaganda techniques have been so successful that it accomplished to generate hate in the international field at the extent where “the City University of New York reduced by one credit every course in German and fourteen states banned the speaking of German in public schools.” (Aaron Delwiche, 2001)
In order to convince the most reluctant and literate people of the society about the necessity of the war the American propagandists had to use a different tactic. Influencing intellectuals and pacifists brought the need of a new kind of arguments such as the establishment of a democratic League of Nations and the end of warfare forever. Concerning other indisposed social groups to the entry on war the CPI used another discourse where they view the war as "a conflict to destroy the threat of German industrial competition (business group), to protect the American standard of living (labour), to remove certain baneful German influences in our education (teachers), to destroy German music - itself a subtle propaganda (musicians), to preserve civilization, 'we' and `civilization' being synonymous (nationalists), to make the world safe for democracy, crush militarism, [and] establish the rights of small nations et al. (religious and idealistic groups)." (Aaron Delwiche, 2001)

Concerning the post-war period, propaganda did not stop as it should probably have. In fact having the ability to influence people is a powerful tool for political leaders who once obtaining it will probably be indisposed to let it go. Along with Aaron Delwiche article, two years after the end of the war, the Director of the CPI's Foreign Division argued that "the history of propaganda in the war would scarcely be worthy of consideration here, but for one fact - it did not stop with the armistice. No indeed! The methods invented and tried out in the war were too valuable for the uses of governments, factions, and special interests." The use of propaganda began to be used in all spheres of life for economical, political and many other purposes. Bernays in his 1928 bombshell Propaganda claimed that "it was, of course, the astounding success of propaganda during the war that opened the eyes of the intelligent few in all departments of life to the possibilities of regimenting the public mind." Moreover, the principal concern of propaganda was peace. Bernays added further: “It was only natural, after the war ended, that intelligent persons should ask themselves whether it was not possible to apply a similar technique to the problems of peace." But American audiences began to doubt about the intentions behind the use of propaganda when there was no need for it. John Dewey suspected the intention of misleading public opinions while presenting news. He clearly announced his assumptions claiming that "paternalistic care for the source of men's beliefs, once generated by war, carries over to the troubles of peace." Dewey thought that the reporting of post-Revolutionary Russia was full of propaganda and attempts of influence. In 1919 the American government finally admitted his faults saying that "what has happened in regard to Russia is the most striking case in point as showing what may be accomplished by Government propaganda...”

To conclude, throughout the history of mass communication , negative tool had been used by the American government such as the use of propaganda during the War World I in order to convince the population to support the war efforts and after it ended to make the peace last . This is why agencies such as the Committee on Public Information were created along with communication strategies where Germany was demonized, lies were spread among the population and ineffective arguments were told to the most reluctant parts of the society.


Reference List

Delwiche, Aaron . Feature Articles: Of Fraud and Force Fast Woven: Domestic Propaganda During The First World War. 2001 .URL: First World War_com - Feature Articles - Of Fraud and Force Fast Woven Domestic Propaganda During The First World War.mht

Lasswell, Harold D. The Theory of Political Propaganda. The American Political Science Review. 1927. (21, 3). 627-631. URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=00030554%28192708%2921%3A3%3C627%3ATTOPP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L